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existence of which in its natural state is
necessary for the support of my land.
That is my neighbor for that purpose; as
long as that land remains in its natural
state, and it supports my land, I have no
right beyond it, and therefore it seems to
me that that is my neighbor for this purpose. There might be land of so solid
a character, consisting of solid stone,
that a foot of it would be enough to support the land. There might be other land
so friable, and of such an unsolid character, that you would want a quarter of
a mile of it; but, whatever it is, as long
as you have got enough land on your
boundary, which left untouched, will
support your land, you have got your
neighbor, and you have got your- neighbor's land to whose support you are entitled. Beyond that, it would appear to
me that you have no rights." It appearing, however, that in this particular case
the intervening strip would have afforded,
if left in its natural state, a sufficient
support to the plaintiff's land, the court
said : "The plaintiffs have no right as
against the landowners on the other side
of that intervening space, and they acquire no right, whatever the owner of the
intervening land may have done. If the

act of the intervening owner has been
such as to take away the support to which
the first landowner who complains is entitled, then, for whatever damage occurb
from the act which he has done, the first
owner may have an action ; but an action
against the intervening owner, not an action against the owner on the other side ;
and it appears to me that it would be
really a most extraordinary result that
the man upon whom no responsibility
whatever originally rested, who wa
under no liability whatever to support
the plaintiff's land, should have that liability thrown upon him without any default of his own, without any misconduct
or any misfeasance on his part. I cannot
believe that any such law exists, or ever
will exist."
The Court of Appeals sustained the decision ofthe Master of the Rolls; BRETT,
L. J., saying: "Although, therefore, this
is a case of first impression,-that is to
say, a case in which we have, after the
Master of the Rolls, for the first time, to
decide what is the proper definition of
'adjacent lands,'-I think the Master ot
the Rolls has given a very happy definition
of them, and one which we ought to accept."
EDMUND H. BENNETT.
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NORTHROP v. GERMANIA FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY.
An agent may properly act for one party to a contract, although he is at the same
time agent for other purposes of the other party.
An agent merely for the care and custody of property may act as agent for an
insurance company in issuing a policy of insurance on the property. The two
capacities are not necessarily inconsistent.
APPEAL from Fond du Lac Circuit Court. This was an action
on a policy of insurance on certain buildings and machinery and
fixtures therein, in Winneconne.
On the trial the court nonsuited
the plaintiff, and he appealed.
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C. E. Sutherland, for appellant.
(Cottrill& Cary, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
LYON, J.-The testimony tended to show that the plaintiff, wic

resided in Ripon, owned considerable real estate in Winneconne,
including the insured property, and that during several years preceding the time when such property was burned, he frequently
employed one Edwards, a land agent at Winneconne, and also the
general agent of the defendant company there, to collect rents and
pay taxes on, and to find purchasers of portions of such real estate.
Edwards was not employed by the plaintiff as his agent in respect
to such real estate generally, but was employed from time to time
to do specific acts in respect to specific property.
From January to about April 1st 1877, a son of the plaintiff was
at Winneconne and during that time had the sole charge of the
insured property as the agent of his father. In the latter part of
March the plaintiff directed his son to have Edwards insure the property in the Underwriters' Agency, the same as Edwards had formerly insured it, and to give the key of one of the buildings to
Edwards and have him "take charge of and see to all of the property in the building." The defendant company is a member of
the Underwriters' Agency. Pursuant to the above instructions,
plaintiff's son applied to Edwards to insure the property. Edwards
agreed to do so and they arranged that he should retain the premium out of a larger sum in his hands collected by him for the
plaintiff. Edwards stated that he was busy then but would write
the policy the next day, and that in the meantime the property was
insured. The son then put the property in his charge and left Winneconne.
Edwards neglected to write the policy until May 7th. A few
hours after he had written it and mailed his report of the transaction to the proper office, the property was destroyed by fire.
We do not say the above facts are proved; but only that there is
sufficient evidence tending to prove them, to support a special finding that they are true. The nonsuit was granted on the sole ground
that the uncontradicted evidence proved Edwards to have been the
agent of the plaintiff when he -wrote the policy. Because he was
such agent the court was of the opinion that he had no authority to
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write the policy, and hence, that the same does not bind the defendant company.Under the testimony the jury might properly have found that
Edwards had no control of the property except to watch over it and
guard it against destruction or injury. For the purposes of this
appeal we must assume that he had no other power over it. Unless
it can be held, therefore, that the mere watchman or guard of the
property of another, who happens at the same time to be an insurance agent, is thereby incapacitated to write a valid policy on the
property at the request of the owner, this judgment cannot be sustained. We are aware of no case in which it has been so held ;
certainly none was cited on the argument; and we are cognisant
of no rule of law which incapacitates an insurance agent thus intrusted with the care of property, to write a valid policy upon it.
Indeed, it was well said in argument that presumably it is for the
interest of the insurance company taking the risk that the insured
property be watched and guarded by its own chosen agent.
We conclude, therefore, that the nonsuit cannot be supported on
the ground upon which the court granted it. We are also of the
opinion that no other fact fatal to a recovery on the policy is intontrovertibly proved. As the action must be again tried, we purposely abstain from commenting upon other questions which were
very ably argued by counsel, lest we might inadvertently prejudice
one party or the other on the trial. It is deemed advisable to go
no farther on this appeal than the present exigencies of the case
require us to go, leaving to both parties a clear field for future contest.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded for a new trial.
TAYLOR, J.,

took no part in the decision.

It is a rule well settled both upon principle and authority that no agent will
ever be allowed to take upon himself incompatible duties and characters, or to act
in a transaction where he has an adverse
interest or employment. It is also laid
down as a general principle that the same
individual cannot, without their knowledge and consent, be the agent of both
parties in the same transaction: Hinckley v. Arey, 27 M1e. 362, where it was
held that, in making a contract for the
composition of a debt, the same man could

not represent both parties. So, in Greenwood v. Spring, 54 Barb. 375, it was heid
that a person sustaining the relation of
agent to both parties could not execute a
mortgage as the attorney of one for the
benefit of the other. So, one cannot act
as agent for both seller and purchaser,
and recover compensation from both, unless both know of and assent to his undertaking such agency and receiving commission from both: Meyer v. THanchtt,
39 Wis. 419; s. c. 43 Id. 246; Matkins v. Coresaol, I E. D. Smith 65;
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Vanderpoel v. Kearns, 2 Id. 170; Ererhart v. Searle, 71 Penn. St. 256 ; Benwett v. Kidder,5 Daly 512 ; Lloyd v. Colston, 5 Bush. 587. The rule is the same
where an exchange of property is effected
by a broker: Pugsley v. Murray, 4 E.
D. qmith 245 ; Farnsworth v. Hemnmer,
I Allen 494 ; Walkerv. O.good, 98 MIass.
348; Rice v. Mood, 113 Id. 133; Raisin v. Clark, 41 .2d. 158; Meyer v.
Hanclett, supra; Lynch v. Fallen, 11
R. I. 311.
Where, however, each owner, with the
knowledge that the broker was employed
by both, promises to pay him a commission, such promise may be enforced:
Pugsley v. Murray, supra; Rowe v. Stecens, 53 N. Y. 621 ; Alexander v. N.
11'. Ch. University, 57 Ind. 466. And
when a middleman brings together a
buyer and seller, each of whom has
agreed, without the knowledge of the
other, to pay the middleman a comnission
on any contract which may be made between them, in the making of which the
middleman takes no part as agent for
either, it is held, that the conduct of the
middleman in concealing from each his
agreement with the other, is not fraudulent, and is no defence to an action
brought by him against either for the commission agreed upon: Rupp v. Sampson,
16 Gray 398 ; Siegel v. Gould, 7 Lans.
177 ; ifullen v. Keelzleb, 7 Bush 253.
The contract, however, in a case where
the same person has improperly acted as
•.he agent of both parties in the same
transaction, is voidable only, at the election of the principal upon timely application to the court, and is not absolutely
void: Greenwood v. Spring, supra. It
is at the option of the principal to avoid
or ratify the contract irrespective of any
proof of actual fraud; he is not bound
to show that any improper advantage
has been taken over him: Greenwood v.
Spring, supra. And while a person cannot properly be the agent of both parties,
buyer and seller, yet, if he accepts the
position of agent for the buyer without

disclosing the fact that he is agent for thu
seller, he cannot afterwards repudiate
such position to shield himself from liability to the buyer, on the ground that he
was agent for the seller. Having assumed the relation of agent for the buyer,
he must be held to a strict performance
of the duties, and to all the liabilities the
relation imposes:' Cotton v. Hlolliday, 59
Ill. 176. See also, Bower v. Johnson,
28 La. Ann. 9.
The rule that the same individual cannot be the agent of both parties, seems
properly to be limited to cases where the
agency relates to the same transaction, or
involves incompatible duties. And with
relation to both of these cases, the knowledge and consent of both parties that the
agent should act for both, will remove
the objection.
In Hinckley v. Arey, it was held that
when the composition had been agreed
upon with the creditor by the agent of
the debtor, he could become the agent
of the creditor for another and distinct
purpose, such as holding the money fos
the use of the creditor.
In Sumner v. The Charlotte, C. 4- A.
Railroad Co., 78 N. C. 289, it is said
that the law does not favor double agencies. It appearing, therefore, in that
case, which was an action for damages
against the railroad company, that the
plaintiff had employed one C., who was
a depot agent of the defendant, to purchase cotton for him and to hold and ship
it under his directions, it was held, that
C., in so dealing in cotton for the plaintiff, acted solely as the plaintiff's agent,
and there was no liability on the part of
the defendant for any loss resulting from
C.'s failure to perform his duties as such
agent.
In Adams Mining Co. v. Senter, 26
Mich. 73, and Colwell v. Keystone Iron
Co., 36 Id. 51, the rule is laid down more
accurately, that there is no principle of
law which precludes a person from acting
as agent for two principals. In the former case, CAMPBELL, J., referring to the
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claim that the double agency in the case
(the same person being the agent of the
two mines in the same vicinity) involved
a conflict of duties, and that all of the
agent's dealings, whereby the property
of one company was transferred to, or
used for the other, should be held unlawful, said: "There is no validity in such
a proposition. The authority of agents
may, when no law is violated, be as large
as their employers choose to make it.
There are multitudes of cases where the
same person acts under power from diflerent principals in their mutual transactions. Every partnership involves such
double relations. Every surrey of boundaries by a surveyor jointly agreed upon
would come within similar difficulties.
It is only where the agent has personal
interests conflicting with those of his
principal, that the law requires peculiar
safeguards against his acts. There can
be no presumption that the agent of two
parties will deal unfairly with either.
And when they both deliberately put him
in charge of their separate concerns, and
there is any likelihood that he may have

to deal with the rights of both m the same
transactions, instead of lessening his powers, it may become necessary to enlarge
them far enough to dispense with such
formalities as one man would use with
another, but which could not be possible
for a single man to go through with
alone."
In Colwell v. Keystone Iron Co., supra, it was held competent for a person
in the general employ of the vendor, to
accept, bythe consent of all parties, as
agent of the vendee, the delivery of the
property sold.
In Helner v. Kroliek, 36 Mich. 371,
the fact that the purchaser of negotiable
paper, resident in a distant part of the
state, employed to collect the same a
person who was also an agent for the
payee, was not considered very significant, as indicating want of good faith in
the purchase.
Tested by the foregoing considerations
the ruling in the principal case seems entirely correct and satisfactory.
MIAnSHALL D. EWELL.
Chicago, March 18th 1880.

United State8 Circuit Court,District of Colorado.
STEVENS v. WILLIAMS

ET AL.

A vein, lode or ledge, within the meaning of the Act of Congress, is a mineral
body of rock within defined boundaries in the general mass of the mountain.
The top or apex of a vein, is the highest point where it approaches nearest to
the surface of the earth, and where it is broken on its edge, so as to appear to be
the beginning or end of the vein.
If a vein at its highest point, turns over and pursues its course downwards,
then such point is merely a swell in the mineral matter, and not a true apex
Where there is a true apex within the surface boundaries of a claim, the claimant can follow the vein in its downward dip beyond his vertical side lines.
And he may follow the vein beyond such side lines at any point where the apex
is within his surface lines, even though his location, for the full length of the claim,
be not along the line of such apex.
And he is entitled to follow the same in its departure from the perpendicula,
in any degree until it reaches the horizontal.

by MILLER, Circuit Judge.
Gentlemen of the jury: After a very long and patient investigaCHARGE
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tion of the case, with the aid which eminent counsel have been able
to give to you and to the court, we approach a point when you and
the court must act in the decision of the questions presented in the
case. It is a satisfaction to me to state, if my experience is of any
value, that I have very rarely seen as many witnesses in so important a case as this, where they have testified so frankly and where I
have been so perfectly convinced of their integrity. * * * And as
this is my first case upon important mining matters-a class of cases
coming more rapidly into the courts than heretofore-I hope that
the miners will always deserve the character which I am happy to
give them in this case, of being true and honest men in what they
endeavor to state.
There are some things, gentlemen, of which I propose to disabuse
your minds before entering upon the real merits of the case. A
great deal has been said about the immense value of the interests at
stake, and I think counsel on both sides have intimated to you that
your verdict may settle rights of property to a very large amount
outside of the case now in controversy. That is quite a mistake;
your verdict settles nothing in the world but the matter in controversy between these parties. Even the opinion which the court
delivers, that, perhaps, may hereafter be used in similar cases as
settling principles, but for which you are not at all responsible, may
be and probably will be revised by the highest court of the country,
the Supreme Court of the United States. So that in delivering
this opinion my brother HALLETT and myself are not decidiing principles finally which govern anybody's case, possibly not even this
case. Therefore, do not be frightened; do not be alarmed; do not
bring in any other verdict than what you would if this were a simple controversy between the owners of the Iron mine and the owners of the Grand View mine, for that is all there is in this case.
The plaintiff has asked certain instructions here which I have
refused, in regard to the testimony, and I regret that they should
have been introduced into his prayer for instructions, but I will
rule upon them so that he can get the benefit of them if he desires.
I am asked by him to state that the patent which he has received
from the United States for the Iron mine is conclusive, that the
sheet of mineral matter in question is a vein, within the meaning
of the statute. I decline to give that instruction. Certainly, outside the vertical projection of the side lines of the plaintiff's patented
ground, if the defendants can show that the mineral matter which is

STEVENS v. WILLIAMS.

the subject of this controversy is not a vein they have the right to
show it. Outside of the side lines of the plaintiff, projected perpendicularly downwards, defendants have the right, if they can, to show
that the vein, or thing which is called a vein, is not a vein.
After disposing of that much of the preliminary matter, I now
proceed to state to you what I understand to be the nature of this
controversy. The plaintiff has a patent from the United States.
which has been read to you, for a mine or lode of mineral matter,
the superficial area of which is three hundred feet in one direction
and fifteen hundred in another on the surface of the earth, as known
and measured by the lines which have been pointed out to you and
are called the end and side lines of the Iron mine. The Act of
Congress on that subject says, that when such title or patent and
such side and end lines cover the top or apex of a vein of mineral
matter, if the party pursuing that vein in a downward direction,
as he pursues it further, escapes from the perpendicular extension
of these side lines, he may still follow that vein as long as he can
find it, and so long as it is the same vein. That part of the statute
is the source of this controversy. The plaintiff, acting upon that
Act of Congress, has pursued what he calls his vein, has pursued
it a very long distance, as shown by that incline on the map, which
is the most continuous, outside of his side lines across the side Hues
of another claim and into the claim of the defendants. If it is a
continuous vein of mineral matter, and if his side lines cover the
apex or outcrop of that vein, and if those lines are extended in a
proper direction across the shoot or course or strike of that vein
matter, he has the right to pursue it. The defendants, commencing
at another point on the surface of the earth and descending perpendicularly as shown on the map, have come to a point where their
shaft intersects the incline which the plaintiff has made in the pursuit of his mineral, and the contest is for the mineral matter where
these two shafts meet, so far as the defendants' claim covers, or may
be supposed to cover it.
Now I state to you in the first place, if that is a vein of mineral matter, within the meaning of the Act of Congress, and in the second
place, if the plaintiff's side lines are laid along the course or shoot
of that vein and inclose its top, apex or outcrop, and if the plaintiff in the pursuit of that vein into the bowels of the earth, pursued
it downwards continuously, he is right in this controversy, and he
should obtain your verdict.
VOL. xxvIII.-38
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The defendants say they are entitled to your verdict upon three
principal grounds:
1. They say that the mass of mineral matter which is the subject
of this controversy is not a vein, lode or ledge, within the meaning
of the Act of Congress.
2. That what the plaintiff claims to be the apex, or top, or outcrop of this lode is no such thing, but is a mere elevation of the
general position of this sheet of mineral matter, and from that point
it continues on a westward dip, and, therefore, this is not an apex
but merely a swell in the mineral matter. And,
3. That the plaintiff has not so located his side lines and end
lines with reference to the strike or course of the mineral, as to entitle him to the benefit of that statute.
Now these are the three points to which your attention is to be
directed, and about which I propose to lay down some matters of
law, which will govern you in the case. But before I proceed to
give my own views in the matter, and because it will, perhaps, facilitate any exceptions that may be taken, I will read to you certain
prayers for instructions asked by the defendants in this case, some
of which I will give to you, others I will modify, and others I will
refuse. The first one which I think is sound law, is as follows:
"In addition to the evidence of the title furnished by the patent,
the plaintiff must show by a preponderance of evidence that he is
the owner of a body of mineral on his patented ground; that such
mineral constitutes a vein of quartz or other rock in place" (and
there I want to say that by rock in place I do not mean merely hard
rock, merely quartz rock, but any combination of rock, broken up,
mixed up with minerals and other things is rock within the meaning of the statute, because it does not say common quartz rock
alone, but it says" that such mineral constitutes a vein of quartz or
other rock in place"), "that being such a vein it penetrates the land
in controversy known as the Grand View claim" (if it is such a
vein and runs under the surface of the earth, if it goes to the perpendicular lines of the Grand View claim; that is what is meant);
".that the top or apex of the vein is within the surface lines of tlb
Iron lode location, and where it enters the land in dispute it does so
in a downward course departing from a perpendicular." Counsel
have inserted here that at the respective points where it leaves the
Iron mine location, and where it enters the land in dispute, it does
so in a "downward course, and departing at both said points from
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a perpendicular." I have cut out so much of that as says that at
the respective points where it leaves the Iron mine location. I
think if the general course of that vein is a departure from the
horizontal, that it covers the case. With the exception of striking
out that single point, "that at the respective points where it leaves
the Iron mine location," I give that instruction.
Second. "And if these conditions are fulfilled it must also appear
that the location of the Iron mine is laid upon the general course,
or strike; that the vein mentioned departs from the plaintiff's location at a point on its general course within the patented side lines."
That is correct. The long lines of the plaintiff's claim must be so
laid, with regard to the general course or strike of the vein, that in
pur~uing it you pursue it to the end lines, or where it leaves the side
lines within those end lines.
Third. "Although the area of ground within the patented lines
of the plaintiff extends fifteen hundred feet in a northerly and
southerly direction, by three hundred feet in width, plaintiff is
only entitled to so much of the Iron lode along its general course
as is embraced within his side lines; and if the body of mineral
within the patent deflects on its general course, so as to cross the
side lines, plaintiff has no right to go beyond such lines to follow
it. If, therefore, the supposed vein of quartz or rock in place,
departs from a perpendicular in its downward course, at any point
on its course, or strike, outside of plaintiff's side lines and then
enters the land in controversy, plaintiff cannot by reason of this
recover in this action." I refuse that for two reasons : if it means
anything more than the language given in the previous instructions, I do not give it. In the second place, it is complex and confusing to the jury. I can hardly understand it myself, and therefore I presume you could not understand it better than I can.
The fourth one I refuse. "In addition to the things already
mentioned as essential to the plaintiff to recover in this action,
the vein of quartz or rock in place" must be "one which, in its
descent into the earth is substantially vertical in its direction"that is, straight down-" which on leaving the side lines of the
plaintiff and entering the land in dispute, departs from a perpendicular and not from a horizontal direction." I refuse that; if
there is any departure from a horizontal direction in a downward
course, it is sufficient.
The sixth one is: The "top" or "apex," within the Act of Con-
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gress, is the highest end or termination of the vein, and this is so,
even though at any intermediate point or points, where the vein is
continuous, it rises higher than such highest end, it being essential
to such "top" or "apex" that there be no vein continuing beyond
it. I give that. It must be the end of the vein which approaches
nearest to the surface, as I shall explain more fully in another part
of the charge. That is the substantial meaning of it.
The next, number seven, is: "In order to constitute a vein of
quartz or other rock in place, which will entitle the plaintiff to
follow it into the land of another, it is not enough that there be a
seam or crevice between rock in place filled with mineral, but the
mineral contained between the rock in place must be of "quartz 6r
other rock." I have explained already to you, the meaning of
other rock, that it did not mean solid rock necessarily, but it means
any rocky substance containing mineral matter-" and unless plaintiff has shown by a preponderance of evidence, the contents of
the supposed vein to be of 'quartz or other rock,' he cannot recover, for under the Act of Congress under which plaintiff claims,
all forms of deposit excepting veins of quartz in rock in place, are
placers." I give that instruction, but with the distinct understanding that all this substance between the porphyry and limestone,
that has been explained to you, which contains mineral-I mean
which contains ore-is rock in place.
The eighth instruction, "although the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff is the owner of a vein of quartz or rock
in place, yet if such vein on its course toward the land in dispute,
be interrupted for a considerable distance, then it ceases to be a
lode or vein so as to give the plaintiff the right to pursue it into
the adjoining land, and in such case the plaintiff cannot recover." I refuse that instruction. In the first place the evidence
is uncontradicted-at least so little contradicted I would not dare
to put that to the jury-that that main incline has metallic ore in
it from beginning to end, as far as it has been carried; and in the
second place, the words "considerable distance," do not convey
any accurate conception. In some cases a mile would be "a considerable distance," and in some cases, where a life depended on
it, half an inch would be a considerable distance.
There is another matter asked by the counsel, which I think is
too complex and I refuse it upon other reasons. I shall, however,
charge the jury upon the whole of that matter.
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Now, gentlemen of the jury, as I make out the subject-matters
to be considered by you in this case, the first one of them for you
to determine is what is a vein, lode or ledge of mineral matter
within the meaning of the statute, and in regard to that matter, I
apprehend you will have no great difficulty in this case. The statute of the United States in determining the terms on which its
mineral lands shall be sold, used or occupied, has divided mineral
lands, at least all that relate to precious metals, into two distinct
classes: they are those which are called placer mines and those
which are called veins, lodes or ledges of mineral matter in quartz
or other rock in place.
Now I do not know that I can better define what is a vein, lode
or ledge to you, than has already been done by my associate on the
Supreme Bench, Brother FIELD, whose learning on that subject is
equal, perhaps, to that of any judge of the United States Courts, and
whose diligence and precision are equal to his learning. Without
going over all that he says about it, most of which was read to you
by Mr. Symes, I adopt and instruct you that a "continuous bed
of mineralized rock, lying within any other well-defined boundaries
on the earth's surface and under it, would constitute a lode, and
that the term is used in the Acts of Congress as applicable to any
zone or bed of mineralized rock, lying within boundaries clearly
separating it from the neighboring rock. It is any class of deposits
of mineral matter coming from the same source, impressed with
the same forms, and appearing to have been created by the same
process." * * * I am also aided by my Brother HALLETT, whose
experience is greater than mine in this matter, and who has also
given the definition of the word, which I propose to read to you as
the law: "In general it may be said that a lode or vein is a body
of mineral or mineral body of rock, within defined boundaries
in the general mass of the mountain ;" and I do not know a better
or more comprehensive definition than that. I say to you, further,
gentlemen, that the thinness or thickness of the matter in particular places does not affect its being a vein or lode; nor does the
fact that it is occasionally found in the general course of this vein
or shoot, in pockets deeper down into the earth or higher up, affect
its character as a vein, lode or ledge.
f say to you, further, that a total interruption of the ore matter,
if the contact remains on each side, the limestone and porphyry
are still preserved, and the vein of mineral matter is found within

STEVENS v. WILLIAMS.

a short distance further on, pursuing that same contact, it is still
a part of the same vein. In short, if there is a general and pervading continuance of this mineral matter with a casual and occasional interruption, but pursuing the same general course, bounded
by the same rocky material above and below as 'far as you can trace
that uitil it breaks off totally and is interrupted for a very large
distance, it is a vein of rock or mineral matter. Now I think you
will have no difficulty in applying these definitions, since the evidence
here is almost uncontradicted that there is such a sheet of matter
as is spoken of. All the witnesses agree that there is a substratum
of limestone and a super-stratum of porphyry; all agree, even defendants' witnesses, that they come to a point where that contact is
so narrow that only a sheet of paper'could be got into it, but stil
it has the well preserved distinction-the porphyry above, the lime
below, and, although in some instances to the south, some to the
north and some occasional spots in the levels, it is stated by defendants' witnesses, that no more vein matter has been found, yet you
must, I think, come to the conclusion that on the whole, and taking
the course on which this matter is in contact from the line of the
plaintiff's location to the line of the defendants' location; taking
the course of that large incline shaft, driven by the plaintiff from
where he first discovered it to where it meets the defendants', it is
for you to say from the testimony, not for me to find for you. But
I can see no reason why you should not say there is a continuous
vein of mineral from the opening shaft, the plaintiff's shaft, to the
point where it reaches the Williams shaft. If that is true-if you
find that to be true, why, notwithstanding these casual interruptions
in various directions, notwithstanding the widening, the narrowing,
the deepening and the shallowness of the vein, notwithstanding it
has, in some places, acknowledged diversions down into the ground,
still, if the miner is able to pursue and has been able to pursue it
in the vein, notwithstanding these interruptions, you are to call it
a vein and treat it as a vein within the meaning of the Act of Congress.
The next point is, that it is denied that there is a top or apex to
this ledge or vein, and that if there is such a one it is not within
the side lines of the plaintiff's patent. Perhaps, upon that point
the defendants have mainly rested their case. I think that you
will agree with me, as all the counsel agree and all the witnesses
agree substantially, conceding that there is a vein, that the top or
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the apex of a vein, within the meaning of the Act of Congress, is
the highest point of that vein where it approaches nearest to the
surface of the earth and where it is broken on its edge so as to
appear to be the beginning or end of the vein. The word "outcrop"
nas been used in connection with it, and in the true definition of
the word, outcrop, as it concerns a vein, is probably an essential
part of the definition of its apex, or top; but that does not mean
the strict use of the word "outcrop."
That would, perhaps, imply
the presentation of the mineral to the naked eye, on the surface of
the earth, but it means that it comes so near to the surface of the
earth that it is found easily by digging for it, or, it is the point at
which the vein is nearest to the surface of the earth; it means the
nearest point at which it is found toward the surface of the earth.
And where it ceases to continue in the direction of the surface, is
the top or apex of that vein. It is said in this case that the point
claimed to be the top or apex is not such, because at the points
where plaintiff shows or attempts to prove an interruption of that
vein, in its ascent towards the surface, and what he calls the beginning of it, the defendants say that is only a wave or roll in the
general shoot of the metal, and that from that point it turns over
and pursues its course downwards as a part of the same vein in a
westerly or southwesterly direction. It is proper I should say to
you if the defendants' hypothesis be true, if that point which the
plaintiff calls the highest point, the apex, is merely a swell in the
mineral matter and that it turns over and goes on down in a declination to the west, that is not a true apex within the statute. It
does not mean merely the highest point in a continuous succession
of rolls or waves in the elevation and depression of the mineral
nearly horizontal.
Now, gentlemen, I have but one more matter, and.really I do not
know that there is much to be said about that. The defendants
maintain that the lines-the side lines-of the plaintiff's claim are
so located in reference to the shoot or strike of the vein which they
claim to pursue, that he has no right to pursue it at the point
where this controversy exists.
You must take all the evidence together, you must take the point
where it ends on the south, where it ends on the north, where it
begins on the west and is lost on the east, and the course it takes,
and from all that you are to say what is its general course. The
plaintiff is not bound to lay his side lines perfectly parallel with the
SIEVENS v. WILLIAMS.
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course or strike of the lode so as to cover it exactly. His location
may be made one way or the other, and it may so run that he crosses
it the other way. In such event his end lines become his side lines,
and he can only pursue it to his side lines vertically extended, as
though they were his end lines; but if he happens to strike out
diagonally as far as his side lines include the apex, so far he can
pursue it laterally; if the vein projects beyond his side lines, then
it is only a question as to the distance which he can include this
vein within his side lines, which I don't see arises in this case at
all; but that is for you to say.
Now, gentlemen, I have laid before you all that I think material
for your judgment in this case. If you believe that that is the top
or apex of the vein on which the plaintiff has laid his claim ; if you
believe that is a vein within the meaning of the act; if you believe
that is a vein under the circumstances and definitions which I have
given you; if you believe that in pursuing that vein to the east, or
clightly to the northeast, the plaintiff has followed substantially a
continuous sheet of ore, although with occasional interruptions, occasional narrowings, occasional enlargements and occasional pockets, yet if it is substantially the same vein and sheet of ore and he
has followed it and found the defendant in possession in the line of
his openings, the law is with the plaintiff. If you do not believe
all of these propositions are established, the verdict will be for the
defendants.
What is a vein, lode or ledge? The
aining acts of Congress do not define
these terms. Van Cotta, in his scientific
work on Ore Deposits, says: "Veins
are aggregations of mineral matter in fissures of rocks. Lodes are therefore aggregations of mineral matter containing
ores in fissures :" Prime's Translation
26. But it has been said that all scientific views must yield to the construction
which will effectuate the intent of the
Acts of Congress, and that these terms,
as used in such acts, are applicable to
any zone or belt of mineralized rock
lying within boundaries clearly separating it from the neighboring rock, and
include all deposits of mineral matter
found through a mineralized zone or belt
coming from the same source, impressed
with the same forms and appearing to

have been created by the same processes :
Eureka Mining Co. v. Ridmond Mining
Co., 4 Saw. C. C. 302. A quartz lode
is a fissure or seam in the country rock
filled with quartz matter bearing gold or
silver: Foote v. National Mining Co., 2
Mont. 402. To constitute a metalliferous vein or lode, the mineral matter must
beina&sure. Afissure vein is a crack
in the earth across its strata filled with
mineralized matter. Such matter must
be enclosed within what is called counryrock or wal-rock. The sides next to the
lode are called the walls, or, where the
lode is not perpendicular the wall over it
is called the hanging-wall, and that under
it the foot-wall. Veins are generallyclassified as (.) True veins. (2.) Bedded veins. (3.) Contact veins; and
(4.) Lenticular veins. A true vein is
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one which traverses a rock or formation
independently of its texture or position,
and not parallel to its stratification or
foliation. Bedded veins, on the contrary, are those which traverse the country parallel to its stratification or foliation. Contact veins are those which
occur between dissimilar formations.
Tenticular veins are those which thin out
in all directions, which are sometimes
merely local expansions of continuous
fissures, and sometimes mere lefitiform
secretions. In the latter case they are
not really veins: Van Cotta 28. The
definition and question of the formation
of veins are quite distinct from that of
the manner in which they have been
filled-the latter not being discussed in
the above reported decision and therefore
not being entered upon here.
What is the top or apex of a vein?
The definition given by the court in the
principal case is uncertain and unsatisfactory. The highest point, or the
point nearest the surface of the earth,
may be a great distance from the surface.
Does the cot-rt mean that the beginning
or end of a vein, assuming such beginning or end to be the highest point
reached thereby, is necessarily and always a top or apex ? It would seem so,
and if so, then a top or apex of a vein
will be frequently found deep down in the
earth and to be reached only after passing through solid formation. The court
concedes that the word "outcrop" is an
essential part of the definition of a vein,
but announces that the word is not to be
used in its strict sense, and that the word,
in a legal sense, means a point" so near
to the surface that it is found -easily by
digging for it, or, it is the point at which
the vein is nearest to the surface of the
eat .h; it means the nearest point at
which it is found toward the surface of
the earth." It seems to me that by this
definition every correct conception of an
outcrop is overthrown. Webster defines
the word outcrop, as used by geologists,
to mean, "The coming out of a stratum
VOL. XXVIII.- 39

to the surface of the ground.
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of an inclined stratum which appears at
the surface."
But the court savs that
the vein of mineral need not come out
or appear at the surface, but if it can be
found "easily" by digging (a very indefinite expression), then it is an apex,
or, even if it cannot be found easily by
digging, the point nearest the surface is
an apex or outcrop, and without reference to its distance from the surface. I
am persuaded that this view is erroneous,
and is destructive to the mining interests
of the Leadville district. Under it, if a
man had by chance or otherwise struck
the deposit of mineral on Friar hill at its
highest point, and if at that point, as
would very likely have been the case,
there had been a break in the mineral, he
would have had an apex, and could have
claimed the whole hill, although he may
have made his discovery by sinking a
shaft an hundred feet through solid rock.
He would have found the mineral at the
point nearest to the surface of the earth.
It is quite impossible that Congress, by
the use of these terms, ever intended any
such results. The act was framed upon
the theory that all veins occupy a vertical
position in the earth, and was never intended to apply to deposits of mineral,
even though the same are in place, which
occupy a position substantially horizontal to the earth. While the word outcrop was well known and in use in mining science when the act was adopted,
the word apex was not, and it is clear
that the one was used synonymously and
interchangeably with the other.
How must a claim be located to entitle
the locator to follow the vein beyond his
vertical side lines ? The Act of Congress
provides that where the top or apex of a
vein lies inside of a locator's surface
lines extended downward vertically, such
locator shall have the exclusive right of
possession and enjoyment of such vein,
although the same may so far depart from
a perpendicular in its course downward
as to extend outside of his vertical side
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It has been decided that the loca-

tion must be along the linear course of
the lode, and that if the same be not
upon the line of the vein, and the vein
departs from the lines of the location anywhere upon the length of the same, it is
so far an invalid location that he can take
nothing beyond his vertical side lines:
Wofley et at. v. Lebanon Mining Co., 4
Col. 112 ; &evens v. Williams, per HALLmT, J. ; Carpenters' Mining Code 65.
These decisions are modified by Justice
MiLLER in the above case, and it is held
that, although the location be diagonally
across the vein, the locator can pursue
the same laterally as far as his side lines
include the apex.
The only remaining question is, upon
xhat degree of departure from the perpendicular can a locator follow a vein beyond his side lines ? The decisions thus
far have been substantially in harmony
with the one above, where it is held that
this can be done upon any degree until
the vein reaches the horizontal. Whether
this will be the law as ultimately settled
by the Supreme Court of the United

States may, with great reason, be doubted. The Act of Congress presupposed
that all veins were vertical. Recently
there have been discovered veins nearly
horizontal, and where there is the slightest departure downward from a horizontal position the court treats them as vertical veins. There has probably never
been found a vein lying on a perfectly
horizontal plane, and, therefore, under
the present decisions, all known deposits
of mineral in place are to be considered
vertical veins. It seems to me that upon
broad principles of justice, and considering the language of the act and the state
of mining science at the time it Was used,
the courts will yet arrive at the conclusion that veins lying nearer the horizontal
than the perpendicular are horizontal
veins, and that those approaching nearer
the perpendicular than the horizontal are
vertical veins, and that the position of a
vein is no longer a departure from the
perpendicular when it more nearly approaches the horizontal than the perpen
dicular.
H. B. JoHNsoN,

Supreme Court of the United States.
EMANUEL BAST v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ASHLAND.
A. being indebted to B. on certain promissory notes assigned to B., by writing
under seal, a judgment against C. The assignment provided that if the notes were
not paid at maturity B. might sell the judgment at public sale. Held, that B. was
not bound to take steps for the collection of the judgment before the maturity of the
notes, except on the demand of A. Hd,further, that parol evidence was inadmissible to prove a promise by B. at the time of the assignment, to issue execution on
the judgment.

IN error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
This was an action on three notes made by Bast, the plaintiff ith
error, to the defendant in error, dated March 1st 1876, and pay
able four months after date, two being for 82000 each, and the
other for $3481.79. Simultaneously with the delivery of the notes

the following assignment in writing was made:

BAST v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ASHLAND.

307

"Know all men by these presents, that I, Emanuel Bast, do
hereby transfer and assign to William Torrey, cashier, of Ashland,
Pennsylvania, a certain judgment of June term 1875, in Court of
Common Pleas of Schuylkill county, No. 1292, in which the First
National Bank of Ashland is plaintiff, and the Ringgold Iron and
Coal Company is defendant, and the three several drafts upon which
the said judgment was obtained as collateral security for the payment of two notes of $2000 each, and one for $3481.69, made by
me to order of William Torrey, cashier, dated March 1st 1876,
payable in four months after date, and upon. failure on my part to
pay said notes at maturity, or at the maturity of time for which
the same may be renewed, then the said Torrey, cashier, is hereby
authorized and empowered to sell the same at public sale, after ten
days' notice to me, and apply the proceeds thereof to payment of
ny said notes, and in case the proceeds of same shall not be sufficient to pay said notes, then I promise to pay any balance that may
be due.
" In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and seal, this
1st day of MarcU 1876.
EMANUEL BAST.
[SEAL.]"
Bast was at the time the owner of the judgment assigned, on
which there was due the exact amount of his notes, and on each
of the notes was an endorsement to the effect that the judgment
assigned was held as collateral. There was no legal impediment in
the way of an immediate issue of execution on the judgment, and
until May 19th 1876, the Iron and Coal Company, the judgment
defendant, had unencumbered personal property subject to levy and
sale on execution sufficient to pay the amount that was due. No
execution was issued until June 19th, and before that time the property of the company bad all been exhausted by the prior levy of
executions issued on other judgments. Bast made no demand on
the bank to issue execution on his judgment at any time before
June 19th.
After the naturity of the notes the judgment was sold pursuant
to the authority contained in the assignment and $2141 realized,
which was applied towards the payment of the notes. This suit
was brought to recover the balance due after this application was
made.
Bast filed an affidavit of defence, which in Pennsylvania has the
effect, in cases of this class, of a plea, in which he alleged, 1, that
it was the duty of the bank under the written assignment to have
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issued execution on the judgment prior to the time it did; and, 2,
"that simultaneously with his delivery of said notes to said bank
as aforesaid, as well as said assignment of said judgment as collateral security for the same, it was agreed between deponent (Bast)
and said bank, as part of the transaction, that said bank would
issue execution upon said judgment and proceed to collect the same
whenever the money could be made thereon." He then claimed
that "by reason of the supine neglect of the plaintiff in not issuing
execution as aforesaid, the said judgment assigned to it as aforesaid
as collateral security for the payment of the notes sought to be collected in this case was lost and became worthless, whereby deponent
sufered damages to an amount equal to the fall amount due upon
theThe
notes
in suit."
court
below held that the defence set
up was insufficient in
law and gave judgment for the bank for $5440.46, the balance remaining due on the notes.
To reverse this judgment this writ of error was brought.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WAITE, C. J.-Two questions are presented by the defence in
this case.
1. Was the bank bound by the terms of the written assignment
to take steps for the collection of the judgment before the maturity
of the notes? And,
2. Was parol evidence admissible to prove the alleged promise,
made simultaneously with the assignment and as part of the transaction, to issue execution and collect the judgment whenever the
money could be made thereon?
L. As to the assignment.
No obligation to collect was in terms put on the bank by the
writing. On the contrary, the only power conferred on the bank
in reference to the judgment was to sell if the notes were not paid
at maturity, or at the maturity of their renewals. All parties
seem to have contemplated delay in the collection, and Bast seems
also to have been especially careful to retain in his own hands the
power to withhold execution if he saw fit. Until a sale was made
under the express power granted for that purpose he continued the
actual owner of the judgment, subject only to the lien of the bank
to secure the payment of his notes. So far as anything appears on
the face of the written instrument he retained full control of the
collection by legal process; but whether that be so or not, he cer-
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tainly could call on the bank at any time before a sale to take the
necessary steps, or permit him to do so, to enforce its collection, or
to secure and preserve such priority of lien as the judgment was
entitled to over other judgments or executions thereon. If the
bank had failed to comply with his demand, and loss had ensued,
other questions than such as are now presented might have arisen.
But upon the face of the assignment we are clearly of the opinion
that the bank put itself under no obligation to collect except on the
demand of Bast. Any attempt to do so before the maturity of the
notes, without his consent, would be a direct violation of the terms
of the instrument under which it acquired all its rights.
2. As to the parol evidence.
No principle of evidence is better settled at the common law than
that when persons put their contracts in writing, it is, in the absence
of fraud, accident, or mistake, "conclusively presumed that the
whole engagement, and the extent and manner of their undertaking, was reduced to writing :" 1 Greenl. Ev., sect. 275. In Pennsylvania the stringency of this rule has been very considerably
relaxed, but we have been referred to no case where, in the absence
of fraud or mistake, parol evidence has been admitted to alter the
plain and unequivocal terms of a written instrument. In Martin
v. Berens, 67 Penn. St. 463, the court say: "Where parties, without any fraud or mistake, have deliberately put their engagements
in writing, the law declares the writing to be not only the best but
the only evidence of their agreement, and we are not disposed to
relax the rule. It has been found to be a wholesome one, and now
that parties are allowed to testify in their own behalf, the necessity
of adhering strictly to it is all the more imperative." In this case
the Pennsylvania decisions are extensively reviewed, and the exceptions to the rule of the common law which they recognise carefully
stated, but the conclusion is that, "as a general rule, it (parol evidence) is inadmissible to contradict or vary the terms of a written
instrument." Again, in Bernhartv. Biddle, 29 Penn. St. 96, this
language is used: " Where parties have deliberately put their
engagements in writing, and no ambiguity arises out of the terms
employed, you shall not add to, contradict or vary the language
mutually chosen as most fit to express the intention of their minds.
What if parol evidence prove, never so clearly, that they used such
and such words in making their bargain; the writing signed, if it
contain not those words, is final and conclusive evidence that they
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were set aside in favor of the other expressions that are found in
the written instrument. And hence this rule of law is only a conclusion of reason, that that medium of proof is most trustworthy"
This is the
whiah is most precise, deliberate and unchangeable."
rule, it was said, which prevails in reference "to the terms in which
the writing is couched," and that "evidence to explain the subjectmatter of an agreement is essentially different from that which varies
the terms in which a contract is conceived." It is not always
easy to determine when, in Pennsylvania, parol evidence is admissible to explain a written instrument, but in Anspach v. Bast, 52
Penn. St. 358, it is expressly declared that "no case goes the
length of ruling that such evidence is admitted to change the
promise itself, without proof or even allegation of fraud or mistake.
The contrary has been repeatedly decided." To the same effect is
the case of Hacker v. National Oil Refining Co., 73 Penn. St. 96,
as well as many others that might be cited.
In the present case, as we have seen, the contract with the parties reduced to writing is, in effect, that the bank should not, before
the maturity of the notes, take measures to collect the judgment
assigned without the consent of Bast. The offer was to prove a
contemporaneous parol agreement that it should do so. This is
a clear contradiction of the terms of the written contract, in a matter where there is no pretence of ambiguity, and where there has
been no fraud or mistake.
We think the court below was right in giving judgment for the
bank, notwithstanding the affidavit of merits, and the judgment is
consequently affirmed.

United States Circuit Caurt, District of Massachusetts.
THE SVEND.
REUBEN A. RICHARDS ET AL., LIBELLANTS
L. HANSEN, CLAIMANT AND

AND APPZLLANTS,

V.

HANS

APPELLEE.

Where a vessel, although seaworthy in a general sense, is of such peculiar con.
struction that goods stored in a particular part are liable to injury by salt water in
severe weather, unless protected by appliances not ordinarily used, it is the duty of
the shipowner to provide such appliances, and if he fails to do so he is responsible
for injury to goods stored in such part of the vessel.
In such case the damage is not one of the " dangers of the seas" within the exceptions of the bill of lading.
Where goods are shipped, and the usual bill of lading given, promising to deliver
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the same in good order, the dangers of the seas excepted, without more, and the
goods are found to be damaged, the onus probandiis upon the shipowner to show that
the injury was occasioned by one of the excepted perils.
LIBEL filed by Reuben A. Richards and others against the
hteamship "The Svend," to recover damages for injury to goods
shipped. The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court,
which was delivered by
CLIFFORD, J.-Carriers of goods, if common carriers, contract
for the safe custody,, due transport and right delivery of the same,
and, in the absence of any legislative regulation prescribing a different rule, are insurers of the goods, and are liable at all events
and for every loss or damage, unless it happened by the act of God,
or the public enemy, or the fault of the shipper, or by some other
oause or accident expressly excepted in the bill of lading, and
without any fault or negligence on the part of the carrier: The
(ordes, 21 How. 23. Shipowners and masters of ships employed
as general ships in the coasting or foreign trade, or in general
freighting business, are deemed common carriers by water, and as
such are as much insurers of the goods they transport as common
carriers by land, unless it is otherwise provided in the bill of lading: Story on Bailments (7th ed.) 501. Such a carrier's first duty,
and one implied by law, is to provide a seaworthy vessel, tight and
staunch, and well furnished with suitable tackle, sails or other
motive power, as the case may be, and furniture necessary for the
voyage. Vessels so employed must also be provided with a crew
adequate in number and sufficient and competent to perform the
required duty, and with a competent and skilful master, of sound
judgment and discretion. Owners in such cases must see to it
that the master is well qualified for his situation, as they are
directly responsible for his negligence and unskilfulness in the
performance of his duty. In the absence of any special agreement
to the contrary, the duty of the master extends to all that relates
to the lading and stowage of the cargo as well as to the transportation and delivery of the goods, and for the performance of all
those duties the ship is liable as well as the master and owners:
Elliott v. Rossell, 10 Johns. 7; King v. Shepherd, 3 Story 0. 0.
849; Abbott on Ship. (8th ed.) 478. Goods of great value, consisting of sheet iron in bundles, were shipped by the libellants in
the steamer Svend, bound on a voyage from the port of Liverpool
to the port of Boston. By the manifest it appears that the steamer
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was an iron propellor, carrying general cargo for freight, and that
the shipments belonged to various persons, which, of itself, is sufficient to show that the master and owners were common carriers
in the strictest sense. Sufficient also appears to show that the
goods, when shipped, were in good order and condition, and that
the covenant of the bill of lading is that they shall be delivered in
like good order and condition. One thousand bundles of the shipment, stowed in the forward part of the aft lower hold, were badly
wet with salt water to such an extent that, when the bundles were
hoisted out to be delivered, the water dripped out of the same and
appeared muddy with rust. Damages are claimed by the libellants in the libel as amended, for breach of the contract t6 deliver
the goods in the condition specified in the bill of lading in the sum
of $4000, and the evidence shows that the goods shipped were
injured in the manner charged to an amount even greater than
that alleged in the libel. Compensation for the injury is claimed
by the libellants upon the following grounds:
1. Because the evidence proves to a demonstration that the goods
were shipped in good order and condition, and that the respondents
have failed to show that the injuries to the goods resulted from the
excepted perils, or any of them, or from the fault of the shipper.
2. Because the steamer was unseaworthy, in that she was not of
a construction suitable to carry such a cargo on such a voyage at
that season of the year.
3. Because the ceiling of the steamer was not of a suitable character nor fit to protect such cargo from salt water on the described
voyage.
4. That the goods injured were not properly stowed or dunnaged
for their protection against injuries of the kind on such a voyage.
Two points are not controverted in argument by the respondents:
1. That the goods were in good order and condition when
shipped.
2. That the quantity mentioned in the libel was injured in the
course of the voyage, and that it was not in good order and condition when delivered.
Conceded or not, the evidence to that effect is satisfactory and
eonclusive, but the respondents explicitly deny every other proposition submitted by the libellants, and insist as follows :
1. That the burden of proof is upon the libellants to prove that
the injury to the goods did not result from the excepted perils.
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2. That the steamer was in all respects seaworthy, and of suitable construction and equipment to transport such a cargo on such
a voyage at that season of the year.
3. That the ceiling of the ship was sufficient, and that the goods
were properly stowed and dunnaged.
Hearing was had in the District Court, and the District -Court
entered a decree dismissing the libel, from which decree the libellants appealed to this court. Since the appeal was entered here
more than sixty witnesses have been examined by the parties,
which renders it necessary to review all the findings of the court
below, as well as the legal principles applied in disposing of the
case.
Due shipment of the goods is not denied, nor is it controverted
that the steamer sailed from Liverpool March 24th 1873, and that
she arrived at Boston, her port of destination, April 14th, in the
same year. Certain exceptions are contained in the bill. of lading.
At the time of the voyage the steamer was comparatively a new
vessel, it appearing that she was built in October of the previous
year. Competent expert witnesses in great numbers describe the
construction of the steamer under deck as low-waisted forward
of the poop, and express the opinion that she was unfit to make
such a voyage during the winter months. They were asked to give
the reasons for that conclusion, and answered to the effect that in
such a construction as that described the tendency in rough weather
would be to fill the waist with water, and to cause the vessel to
strain and roll deep and heavy. When asked what effect the strainhold, the
ing of the vessel would have upon her ceiling in the lower
answer was th~at if the vessel labored heavily it would cause her to
blow, that the deeper the ship rolls the higher she will blow the
water in her bilge, particularly if her ceiling is not water-tight.
Sheet-iron, all agree, is quite susceptible to damage from being wet.
and some of the expert witnesses testified that a drop of sea-water will
damage a sheet of the iron, and that it would take very little water to
go through a whole package of such merchandise. Apart from the
construction of the steamer, including her ceiling, no attempt is
made to show that she was unseaworthy. Beyond doubt, she was
comparatively new, and was staunch and strong. Nor is it pre
tended that the damage to the cargo resulted from any defects in
the hull of the vessel or in her equipment, beyond what is embraced
in the charge that her construction in the particulars mentioned
VoL. XMI.-40
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exposed the vessel to unusual strain in bad weather, and tended to
make her roll unusually deep and heavy. Argument to show that
the vessel when she rolls deep and heavy is more likely to blow and
expose cargo stowed in her aft lower hold to wet, is quite unnecessary, as the conclusion accords with all experience, and is fully
established in this case by the evidence, unless the ceiling of the
ship is water-tight. Owners of vessels of such a construction, even
though they are seaworthy in the general sense, are bound to furnish such appliances for the protection of the cargo so stowed, as
will protect it from injury arising .from the ordinary perils of navigation. Damage to cargo occasioned by salt water does not come
within the excepted perils, when by reason of the place in which it
is stowed, it is exceptionally liable to such injury in severe weather:
!Pe Oguendo, 38 Law Times (N. S.) 151. Shipowners, by such a
bill of lading, contract for safe custody, due transport and right delivery of the goods in like good order and condition as when they
were shipped; and it is universally admitted that the contract implies that the ship is reasonably fit and suitable for the service
which the owner engages to perform ; that she is, and shall continue
to be, in a condition to encounter whatever perils of the sea a ship
of the kind laden in that way may be fairly expected to encounter
in the contemplated voyage. Safe custody is a part of the contract,
and if, in consequence of the peculiar construction of the ship, further appliances are necessary to protect the cargo from, injury by
ordinary perils, not excepted in the bill of lading, the duty of the
owner is to furnish all such, and if he fails to do so, he is responsible for the consequences: The Marathon, 40 Law Times (N. S.)
163. Explicit exceptions may excuse imperfections of construction
or repairs, but, in the absence of express words to the contrary, a
bill of lading in the usual form implies a warranty of seaworthiness
when the voyage begins, and all the exceptions in it must, unless otherwise expressed, be taken to refer to a period subsequent to the sailing of the ship with the cargo on board. As for example: Wheat
was shipped at New York for Scotland, under a bill of lading excepting perils of the seas, however caused. During the-voyage the*
wheat was damaged by sea-water. In an action by the holders of
the bill of lading against the owners of the ship, the jury having
fou.d that the water obtained access to the cargo in consequence
of one of the ports being insufficiently fastened, the subordinate
court entered a verdict for the shipowners, upon the ground that

RICHARDS v. HANSEN.

the loss was covered by the exception in the bill of lading. But
the House of Lords, on appeal, reversed the judgment, and held
that as in order to bring the loss within the exceptions it must be
found that the ship sailed with the port in a seaworthy state, a new
trial must be had, it not appearing that that fact had been found
by the jury: Steel v. State Line Steamship Co., 37 Law Times (N.
S.) 333 ; Lyon v. Alells, 5 East 428.
Two defects are suggested in the steamer, both of which, if they
be defects, existed at the time the ship sailed:
1. That the construction of the ship, as already explained, rendered her unfit to transport such a cargo on such a voyage at that
season of the year.
2. That the ceiling of the ship, in view of her peculiar construction, was not sufficient to protect such cargo from damage by salt
water in such a voyage during the winter months of the year, when
rough weather may reasonably be expected.
Rough weather, as all experience shows, may be expected on
such a voyage in the winter and early months of the year, but the
respondents deny that the construction of the steamer rendered her
unfit to transport such goods on such a voyage, and insist that her
ceiling was properly constructed and sufficient to protect such
cargo, in the place where it was stowed, from damage by salt
water and from every peril within the contract of the bill of lading. When built the steamer was ceiled with a permanent ceiling
up to her deck. It is claimed by the respondents, that she had
during the voyage, in addition to that, a temporary ceiling up to
the turn of the bilge, but the evidence taken as a whole does not
sustain that theory of fact. Even the master testifies, that "she
was ceiled all the way up to the deck," but he says nothing about
any such additional temporary ceiling as that supposed by the
respondents. Surveyors examined the steamer in New York, and
one of them speaks of the vessel as ceiled to the deck, but makes
no mention of any temporary ceiling of any kind. Proof that the
steamer had no such ceiling, is also derived from the statements
of the consignee, who testifies that he went down into her hold
after she was discharged, and he states that she was ceiled from
the keelson entirely up to the deck. Nor does he say a word about
any additional ceiling. Ships carrying grain frequently have
what is called a grain ceiling, in addition to the ordinary permanent ceiling, which usually extends only to the upper turn of the
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bilge. Unlike that, a grain ceiling is a temporary appliance built
up as dunnage to keep the grain removed from the permanent ceiling. Support to the theory of the respondents that the steamer
had such temporary ceiling for the protection of the cargo in question, is derived chiefly from the testimony of the head stevedore,
who superintended the discharge of the cargo, and the fact that the
steamer, on her former voyage from Odessa to Falmouth, for orders,
carried a cargo of wheat, which was delivered without injury.
Beyond all doubt, the evidence shows that the damage was causel
by salt water, which came in contact with the bundles of sheet iron,
as they lay stowed in the aft lower hold; and it is equally clear
that the water must have reached the iron in large quantities to
have caused such extensive damage to one thousand bundles of the
iron, estimated to weigh fifty-five tons. Cargo stowed in the same
hold, above the bundles of sheet-iron, came out in good condition;
and the witnesses for the respondents agree that there had been no
leakage through the hatches, from which it would seem to follow
that the water must have come from below.
Confirmation of that view of a persuasive character is derive.]
from the testimony of the master, who in direct terms attributes the
damage to the blowing of bilge water through the seams of the ceiling in the after hold when the steamer rolled. Cogent support to
that theory is also derived from the testimony of the mate, who
expresses the opinion that it was caused by the ship laboring so
heavily and rolling. Convincing confirmation of that theory, if
more be needed, is also found in the testimony of port-warden Paine,
who testified that when he went down into the after hold he did not
see anything that denoted a leak, and he expressed the opinion that
it must have been done by what is called blowing, that is that the
bilge water swashes up when the ship rolls, and he added that it is
a common thing for bilge water to blow up when the ship labors, -as
explained, and that it does not take much water to damage sheet
iron. Few steamers have their ceiling caulked so as to be water
tight, and in all cases where they do not it seems that the blowing
of bilge water through the seams of the ceiling is a common occurrence when the vessel -rolIa Steamers as well as sail ships, roll
more or less on every such voyage, varying in degree with the state
of the wind, the construction of the vessel, the manner in whichshe is loaded, and the means by which she is propelled. Even suppose that cases may arise where it would properly be held that blow-
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ing is a peril of navigation, within such an exception in a bill of
lading, it is clear such a rule cannot be applied in this case, as it
appears that the goods might have been protected from such damage by a reasonable foresight, care and prudence, the rule being
that the carrier ought to take adequate measures to protect the cargo
against a common and ordinary occurrence which might and ought
to have been foreseen: Bearsev. 1Ropes, 1 Sprague 332. Dangers
of the sea, said Judge STORY, whether understood in its most limited sense as importing only a loss by the natural accidents
peculiar to that element, or whether understood in its more extended sense as including inevitable accidents upon that element,
must still in either case be clearly understood to include only such
losses as are of an extraordinary nature, or arise fiom some irresistible force or some overwhelming power which cannot be guarded
against by the ordinary exertions of human skill and prudence:
The .eeside, 2 Sumn. 571. Hence it is that, if the loss occurs by
a peril of the sea that might have been avoided by the exercise of
any reasonable skill or diligence at the time when it occurred, it is
not deemed to be in the sense of the phrase such a loss by the perils of the sea as will exempt the carrier from liability: Story on
Bail. (7th ed.) § 512 a; Nugent v. Smith, Law Rep. 1 C. P. Div.
437; 3 Kent's Com. (12th ed.) 217. Both parties agree that the
steamer was well built, and that in the general sense she was seaworthy when the voyage began and when it ended at the port of
destination, the only defect alleged by the libellants being that in
consequence of her peculiar construction and the insufficiency of
her ceiling and dunnage, she was unfit to carry sheet-iron stowed
in her aft lower hold on such a voyage during the winter and early
spring months of the year: and the court is of the opinion that the
great weight of the evidence fully sustains that proposition. It
may be that the steamer would have been a fit and proper vessel to
carry such cargo on such a voyage in a milder season of the year,
or that she would have been a fit and proper vessel for the voyage
in question if her ceiling had been water-tight, or if the sheet-iron
had been stowed between decks, but it is very clear in the judgment
of the court, that the construction and defective ceiling of the
steamer, taken in connection with the place and manner of stowage,
Tendered her unfit to transport such goods on such a voyage at that
season of the year. By the terms of the bill of lading safe custody
is as much a part of the contract of the carrier as due transport
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and right delivery. When shipped the sheet-iron was in good
order and condition, and when delivered it was badly damaged by
salt water, the evidence showing to the satisfaction of the court that
the water obtained access to the goods through the seams or
crevices in the ceiling of the steamer.
Evidence of leakage is not exhibited in the record, and inasmuch
as it is proved that the cargo stowed above the iron in the same hold
came out dry, it seems clear, almost to a demonstration, that if the
ceiling bad been water-tight no such damage would have been occasioned, and that the swashing of the bilge water between the sides
of the vessel and the ceiling would not have caused it to reach the
sheet-iron, though stowed in the aft lower hold.
Where goods are shipped and the usual bill of lading given, promising to deliver the same in good order, the dangers of the seas
excepted, without more, and they are found to be damaged, the onus
probandiis upon the owners of the vessel to show that the injury was
occasioned by one of the excepted perils: 0lark v. Barnwell,12 How.
272 ; Story on Bail. (7th ed.) § 529 ; .Nelson v. Woodruff, 1 Black
156. Reported cases, however, may be found where it is held that if
an excepted peril is shown which is adequate to have occasioned the
loss, the burden of proof shifts, and that the shipper, in such a case,
is required to show that it was not occasioned by that peril, but by
some negligence of the carrier, which rendered that peril efficient,
or co-operated with it, or brought it about without any connection
with the sea peril: The Invincible, 1 Lowell 226; The L-exington,
6 How. 384. Such shipowners, carrying goods under a bill of
lading by which they contract to deliver the goods in good order
and condition, certain perils excepted, are bound to deliver the same
in that condition unless prevented by those perils, and are responsible for any damage to the goods occasioned otherwise than by those
perils: The -ha8ea, 32 Law Times (N. S.) 838. Three marine
surveyors examined the steamer after her return, and concur in the
opinion that she was not fit for such a voyage, at that season, in
view of her construction and consequent tendency to roll and produce blowing in a heavy sea, and many other witnesses are of the
same opinion. Her internal construction was such that bilge water
could blow into the hold through the seams of her ceiling when she
rolled, it appearing that her ceiling was built upon the ribs of the'
ship, beginning at the keelson, only fourteen inches above her iron
bottom, and that it continued all the way up to her main deck, being
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only about four inches away from her iron sides, which shows that
bilge water might rush up between the ceiling and her iron sides
whenever the ship rolled, as there is no evidence to show that the
seams of the ceiling were caulked or pitched before she sailed, or at
any time during the voyage. Defects of the kind might easily have
been remedied before the voyage began, or at any time during its
progress; but it does not appear that any attempt was made to
apply any of the known remedies for such defects. Stowage in the
lower hold may be a fit place even for such a cargo in a steamer of
a different construction, and doubtless might have been in the
steamer of the libellants if the ceiling had been water-tight, or if
proper means had been devised and applied to prevent the bilge
water, when the vessel rolled, from blowing or escaping through the
seams of the ceiling and finding access to the sheet-iron as stowed
in the hold. Suitable appliances, it is not doubted, would have
prevented such consequences, and protected the cargo from damage. Nothing of the kind was done or attempted, and, in view of
the exposed condition of the cargo from the causes shown, the conelusion must be that the place where the same was stowed was an
unfit place, in that steamer, for stowing such cargo on such a voyage, at that season of the year.
Defences of various kinds are set up in argument, of which tho
two principal ones deserve to be specially examined.
1. That the bill of lading excepts leakage, breakage and rust;
the language of the instrument being "not answerable for leakage,
breakage or rust."
2. That the damage was caused by the perils of the seas, within
the meaning of the bill of lading.
I. Two or more answers may be made to the defence, arising
from the said exception:
1. It is not adequate to have occasioned the loss. Rust may be
caused by sweat or mere moisture of the air in the place where
goods are stowed, and it may be that the exception is adequate to
cover such a loss, and in such a case to shift the burden of proof
from the carrier to the shipper, to show that the loss was not
occasioned by that peril.
2. Concede that, but it by no means follows that such an exception is adequate to cover the damage in this case, which arose from
the profusely wetting and soaking the sheet-iron in salt bilge water,
blown through the seams and crevices of the ceiling on the sides of
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the place where the iron was stowed. Viewed in the light of the
actual circumstances, it is clear that the exception is neither ade.
quate nor sufficiently comprehensive to cover the damages occasioned
by the means proved in this case.
3. Suppose, however, it may have the effect to shift the burden
of proof, still it does not follow that the defence is a valid one, as
it fully appears that the evidence introduced by the libellants is
sufficient to overcome every presumption in favor of the carrier,
and to show that the damage was occasioned by mere want of foresight, -care and diligence.
II. Nor is there any better ground to support the second defence.
Evidence to support the defence was introduced in the court below,
consisting of the depositions of the master, mate and engineer of
the steamer, and the protest filed in the case; and those documents
are exhibited in the record, together with the depositions of nineteen other witnesses taken since the appeal, of which sixteen were
introduced by the libellants. Ships carrying cargoes as common
carriers must be fitted to encounter ordinary sea perils on the voyage described in the contract of shipment. Injuries to cargo resulting from such perils give the shipper a right of action against the
carrier, but the court below, on the evidence then exhibited, found
that the gales were proved to be of extraordinary violence, and
such as would have been likely to damage a seaworthy ship, and to
come within the usual definition of such perils. Responsive to
that, the first observation to be made -is, that the gales referred to
did not damage the steamer of the respondents in the slightest
degree worth mentioning, as appears from all the testimony exhibited as to her condition after she arrived-at her port of destination.
Except that the muzzle around the end of the pipe under the ceiling broke loose, there is no proof of actual damage to the steamer,
and it is not claimed that the expenses of repairing that injury
would amount to more than a nominal sum. Witnesses called by
the respondents, especially the officers of the steamer, sustain the
theory of the respondents that the gales which the steamer encountered were extraordinary, but in view of the very slight damage to
the vessel, and the contradictory testimony introduced by the libellants since the appeal, the court is of the opinion that the violence
of the gales were much exaggerated in the testimony of the officers
as introduced in the court below. The Oquendo, 88 Law Times
(N. S.) 154. Opposed to the theory of the respondents that the
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damage was occasioned by the extraordinary perils of the seas, is the
united testimony of the sixteen witnesses since introduced by the
respondents. Suffice it to say, without reproducing their testimony,
that they are witnesses of great nautical experience, and that they all
iestify in substance and effect that the weather, even as described
by the master, was not more boisterous than is usually found on
that voyage at that season of the year. Eight steamers coming
westward over the same route as the steamer of the respondents,
starting at different times later, overtook and passed her at various
points on her course, and encountered only moderate weather, and
made very good passages as to time. On the other hand, steamers
which left a week earlier than the steamer of the respondents,
encountered severe and heavy weather, such as is to be expected
and is usually experienced during the winter and early spring
months. Inquiry was made of the master whether or not there
was any unusual wind or weather during the voyage, and his
answer was, "We had very heavy gales, sir, but I could not say it
was an unusual thing to have-except at that season-being so far
%dvanced."
Examined in the light of the whole evidence, the court is of the
opinion that the respondents have failed to show that the damage
was occasioned by the perils of the seas within the meaning of the
bill of lading. Much testimony was introduced by the respective
parties in regard to the dunnage of the sheet-iron stowed in the
lower hold. Dunnage usually consists of pieces of wood placed
against the sides and bottom of the hold of the ship, to protect the
cargo from injury by contact with the vessel or other cargo, or by
leakage. Confined to that purpose, the court is of the opinion that
the weight of the evidence shows thai it was sufficient, but if its
purpose be extended as a means to protect the cargo stowed in the
hold from being wet by bilge water blown through the seams and
crevices of a defective ceiling, the court is of the opinion that it
was clearly insufficient to afford any such sufficient protection.
Conclusive proof is exhibited that the ceiling was not water-tight,
and all the witnesses examined upon the subject, except the head
stevedore and one of his assistants, have given evidence tending to
convince the court that the salt water obtained access to the sheetiron through the ceiling. Testimony to the contrary comes chiefly
from the stevedore, but his statements are so indefinite, contradictory, rash and inconsiderate, that they fail to secure the concurrence
VOL. NXVIII.-41
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of the court in their accuracy. Beyond controversy the damage to
the sheet-iron was occasioned by blowing, by which is meant that
the salt bilge water found access to the iron as stowed in the forward part of the afterhold, through the seams and crevices of the
ceiling when the vessel rolled.
It follows that the libellants are entitled to recover, and that the
decree must be reversed.
Separate findings of fact and law are required in an admiralty suit
in the Circuit Court in all cases where the amount in controversy,
on appeal, is sufficient to give the Supreme Court jurisdiction to
re-examine the decree rendered in the Circuit Court; but where the
sum or value in dispute does not exceed the sum or value of $5000,
a more general finding of those matters in the opinion of the Circuit Court will be sufficient: 18 Stat. at Large 315, § 1 ; 316, § 3;
1265 Vitrified Pipes, 14 Blatch. 279.
Prior to the filing of the answer the libellants filed an amendment to the libel, increasing the ad damnum to $4000, and
inasmuch as the respondents made no objection to the amendment
it is deemed proper to regard it as having been duly allowed, as
otherwise it would be allowed by this court. On June 16th 1876,
the libellants asked leave to file a second count as an amendment
to the libel, and the court ordered it placed on file, reserving the
question of its allowance or disallowance to be decided at the final
hearing. Pursuant to that order the amendment, as proposed, is
allowed, but the additional amendment proposed at the argument
further increasing the ad dannum, is disallowed. Evidence as to
the extent of the damage is contained in the record, and in view of
that fact it is not necessary to refer the cause to a commissioner to
ascertain the amount, the court being satisfied that the loss exceeds
even the amended ad damnum of the libel, which is all the court
can allow under the pleadings, except for costs which have arisen
through the fault of the respondents in not paying the just claim
of the libellants: The Wanata, 5 Otto 600, 612.
Decree of the District Court is reversed, and a decree for the
libellants entered for the sum of 84000, with costs.

WERTIIEIMER v. PEN'NSYLV.AXIA RAILROAD CO.

Circuit Court of the United States ; Southern District of New
York.
WERTHEIMER

ET AL.

v. THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD
COMPANY.

The delivery of a bill of lading by a common carrier and its acceptance by the
shipper at the time of the delivery of the goods, constitute a contract between the
parties embracing the conditions contained in the bill of lading.
The shipper who thus accepts a bill of lading cannot allege ignorance of its terms.
Where a bill of lading exempts a carrier from liability from loss by fire, unless
caused by his negligence, the burden of proving negligence is on the shipper.

MOTrON for new trial. The action was to recover the value of
certain goods of the value of $1700, received by defendants from
plaintiffs on July 17th 1877, at New York, for transportation to
Pittsburgh.
At the time of receiving the goods, the defendant delivered to
plaintiffs a bill of lading, whereby it agreed to transport the goodb,
subject to several conditions, among which was one that the company should not be responsible for loss or damage by fire, unless it
could be shown that such damage or loss occurred through the negligence or default of the agents of the company.
On the 17th of July, the car containing the goods was dispatched by defendant from Jersey City for Pittsburgh, reaching
Pittsburgh about 1 o'clock A. m., July 20th, at which time a mob
took possession of the defendant's property, including the car in
question, and held possession until July 22d, when troops ordered
by the governor of the state to aid the sheriff in retaking the property, came in conflict with the mob, failed to dispossess the mob,
and the mob fired the property and thereby destroyed it.
A. L. Sanger, for plaintiffs.
Robinson & Scribner, for defendants.
WALLACE, J.-The delivery of the bill of lading by the defendant and its acceptance by the plaintiffs at the time of the delivery
of the goods, must be deemed to constitute a contract between the
parties, with the conditions contained in the bill of lading: York
Company v. Central Railroad Co., 3 Wall. 107; Bank of Kentucky v. Adams's -Express Co., 93 U. S. 174; Grace v. Adams,
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100 Mass. 505; 1J.ei"illan v. .lichgan Southern J- I. L Railroad Co., 16 Mich. 79; Iopkins v. Westcott, 6 Blatchf. 64;
Kirkland v. Dinsmore, 62 N. Y. 171. These cases all hold that
the shipper who accepts the bill of lading cannot be heard to allege
ignorance of its terms. It is unnecessary to refer to the cases,
where from the peculiar circumstances attending the acceptance of
the receipt, assent to its terms was held not to be implied, as the
present case is the ordinary one, where no peculiar circumstances
are shown. Neither are the cases in point, which decide that
assent on the part of the shipper. will not be implied to any conditions which do not appear on the face of the bill of lading. Such
was the case in Ayres v. Western Transportation Co., 14 Blatchf.
9, which was decided upon the authority of Railroad Co. v. fflanvfacturing Co., 16 Wall. 318.
The effect of the contract made between the parties was to im
pose upon the plaintiffs the burden of proving that the loss of thegoods by fire arose from the negligence of the defendant or its
agents. In Clark v. Barnwell, 12 How. (U. S.) 272. Mr. Justice
NELSON, says: " Although the injury may have been occasioned
by one of the excepted causes in the bill of lading, yet still the
owners of the vessel are responsible if the injury might have been
a7oided by the exercise of reasonable skill and attention on the
part of the persons employed in the conveyance of the goods. But
the onus probandithen becomes shifted upon the shipper to show
the negligence." In Western Transportation Co. v. Downer 11
Wall. 129, the judgment of the court below was reversed, because
the jury were instruicted that it was incumbent upon the defendant,
the carrier, to bring himself within the exception by showing that
it had not been guilty of negligence. Other authorities to the
same point need not be cited, as the cases referred to are conclusive
upon this court.
The plaintiffs have not shown negligence on the part of the
defendant and therefore cannot recover. But irrespective of any
considerations concerning the burden of proof, when it appeared,
as it did here, that the fire by which the plaintiffs' goods were
destroyed was the act of a mob, engaged in a struggle with the
military authorities of the state, without anything to show that the
defendants were bound, from the circumstances, to anticipate such
a result, the defence was affirmatively established.
The motion for a new trial is denied.

AMERICAN UNION TEL. Co. v. TOWN OF HARRISON.
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Court of Ohancery of New Jersey.
AMERICAN UNION" TELEGRAPH CO. v. TOWN OF HARRISON.
A telegraph company authorized to erect its poles upon the streets of a town I first
obtaining the designation of the streets" from the town authorities, does not need
the consent of the town to put its poles on private property outside the lines of the
streets, and to stretch its wires across the streets.
Where, however, the statute also provides that the use of thestreets shall be subject to regulations imposed by the town, this extends the right of regulation to the
hanging of wires across the streets, though the poles are on private property.
But the power of the town is to regulate, not to prohibit, and in the absence of
any regulations on the subject, and in the absence of evidence that the proposed
method of laying the wires by the company will impede or endanger the use of the
street by the public, a court of equity will enjoin the town from interfering with the
wires.

ON an order to show cause why an injunction should not issue,
heard on bill and affidavits on the part of the complainants and on
affidavits on behalf of the defendants.
B. A. Vail and John P. Jackson, for the complainants.
B. L. Price and JT. A Bedle, for the defendants.
VAN FLEET, V. 0.-This is an injunction bill. The complain
ants are engaged in the construction of an electric telegraph between
the cities of New York and Philadelphia. On the morning of the
day on which their bill in this case was filed, their line between
New York and Newark was completed, and telegraphic communication established. For part of the distance between these points
their line passes over territory under the jurisdiction of the defendants. The poles erected within this territory are erected .outside
of the streets or highways and upon private property, but the wires
hung.thereon overhang some twenty streets at an elevation of about
twenty-five feet above the roadway. These poles were erected with
the permission of the owners of the soil, but without the permission
of the defendants. No opposition seems to have been made to the
erection of the poles, but the wires were attached to them and
stretched from pole to pole, -according to the affidavits read on behalf of the defendants, in defiance of their power and only by the
exercise of superior force. The bill charges that the defendants
intend to destroy the line by cutting the wires where they overhang
the streets, and asks that they be enjoined.
When the order to show cause was applied for in the case, strong
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doubts were expressed whether the bill stated any fact that would
authorize the interference of this court, which could properly be
regarded as the act of the defendants as a municipal body. The
bill simply charged that certain officers of the town had opposed the
hanging of the wires, and that one of them, claiming to represent
the town, threatened, if the wires were put up, that the town would
cut them down. The bill exhibited such a meagre case that I hesitated to grant the order to show cause. All doubt upon the subject has however been dissipated by the defendants. They answer
the order to show cause, not by disclaiming responsibility for the
conduct of their officers, but attempt to show that as a municipal
body they resisted the erection of the wires by force, almost to riot
and bloodshed. They do not attempt to deny or conceal the fact
that it is their purpose, if relieved from restraint, to commit the
injury against which the complainants appeal to the court for protection. There can be no doubt that the injury apprehended belongs
to the class which it is the duty of a court of equity to prevent in
limine. If the wires are cut or broken even at a single point, the
line between its principal termini is completely destroyed. Unless
the mischief threatened is prohibited at the very outset, it is undeniable the complainants must suffer serious and irreparable loss.
The complainants were organized under the General Telegraph
Law (Revision 1174). The eighth section is the only part of the act
containing anything material to this controversy. It first grants to
any corporation organized under it the right to use the public highways of the state for the purpose of erecting posts or poles, upon
first obtaining the consent in writing of the owners of the soil. It
then provides that no posts or poles shall be erected in any street
of any'incorporated town, without first obtaining from the town a
designation of the streets in which the same shall be placed, and
the manner of placing the same. This beyond all doubt must be
construed to be a plain inhibition against the use of the streets by
any telegraph company for the purpose of erecting their poles
therein without first applying to the municipal authorities for direction as to where and in what manner they shall be erected. The
legislative purpose is very plain. The design is to invest telegraph
companies with the right to use the streets of an incorporated town
for the purpose of erecting their poles therein, subject, nevertheless,
to such municipal control as shall be necessary to secure to the public, safety, convenience and freedom in the use of the streets. The
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municipal authorities may say what streets shall be used, at what
points in the streets the poles shall be erected, and how they shall
be planted and secured, but they have no power to lay an embargo.
They have a right to regulate but not to interdict, and their regulation to be valid must be reasonable and fair. But this provision
has no application to the case in hand. The complainants have
erected their poles outside of the streets on private property, and
so long as the poles in no way imperil the safety of those who use
the streets, the town authorities can lawfully exercise no control
over them. But another part of this section must be considered.
By the last clause it is enacted "that the use of the public streets
in any of the incorporated towns (by any corporation organized
under this act) shall be subject to such regulations and restrictions
as may be imposed by the corporate authorities." The clause previously considered related only to such use of the streets as would
be made if poles were erected therein. The clause just quoted is
much broader, and comprehends any use which can be made of them
by a telegraph company. It comprehends hanging wires over the
roadway. The public easement is not limited to the use of the soil
of the highway, but extends upwards indefinitely. A barrier
stretched above the roadway, or the bough of a tree overhanging it,
may constitute a nuisance: Barber v. Roxbury, 11 Allen 320;
Angell on Highways, § 223. Under this clause the town authorities may adopt regulations fixing the elevation at which telegraphic
wires shall cross the streets, and they may also prescribe such other
precautions as may be reasonably necessary to the safety of travel.
But no such regulations have been adopted by the defendants. So
far as appears, the town authorities have never even entered upon
the consideration of the question whether it is expedient or not to
exercise the power given to them by this clause. When by appropriate proceedings they shall have prescribed regulations upon this
subject, the complainants will be obliged to conform to them, but in
the meantime they cannot compel the complainants to desist from
the further construction of their work. Upon the facts before me
there is no reason whatever to believe that the wires as they now
overhang the streets do in the slightest degree impede or endanger
their full, free and safe use.
I am of the opinion that the complainants in erecting their poles
on private property, and in hanging their wires on them, at an elevation of twenty-five feet above the roadway, did nothing but what

